DIETZEN, Justice.
Appellant Timothy Chambers was found guilty by a Rice County jury of first-degree
On May 3, 1996, 17-year-old Timothy Chambers walked to the Priordale Mall in Prior Lake to fill out a job application. As Chambers was leaving the mall, he saw a parked Lincoln Town Car with the keys inside. Chambers took the Lincoln and drove it away from the mall. The Lincoln's owner reported it stolen shortly after Chambers took it, and Chambers was soon stopped by Deputy Donald Buchan of the Scott County Sheriff's Department. When Buchan exited his squad car, Chambers drove the Lincoln into Buchan's car and then drove away. Buchan and other officers pursued Chambers for over 30 miles. During the pursuit, Chambers caused the Lincoln to bump against Buchan's squad car, drove through several red lights, and then hit a truck stopped at an intersection. When Chambers reached I-35, he turned south and operated the vehicle at speeds of 90 to 110 miles per hour. Near the Dakota/Rice County border, two semi-trucks blocked both lanes on I-35 in an attempt to slow Chambers, but he avoided the trucks by driving into the median and then exiting I-35.
At the top of the exit ramp, Rice County Deputy Sheriff John Liebenstein set up a roadblock with his unmarked squad car. Liebenstein left space for other vehicles to go around the roadblock. According to eyewitness testimony, when Chambers drove up the exit ramp toward the roadblock, he accelerated the Lincoln and hit the unmarked squad car on the passenger side between the front and rear wheels. It was unclear whether Liebenstein was seated in the squad car or standing outside it; but following the collision, Liebenstein was found dead approximately 70 feet from the point of impact. There was no evidence that Chambers attempted to slow down or avoid the roadblock.
A grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Chambers, charging him with: first-degree murder of a peace officer,
On direct appeal, Chambers argued, among other things, that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release imposed upon him violated the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. State v. Chambers (Chambers I), 589 N.W.2d 466, 479 (Minn. 1999); see U.S. Const. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Minn. Const. art. I, § 5 (prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment). Chambers did not argue that a life sentence without the possibility of release was disproportional to the crime of first-degree murder of a peace officer. Consequently, we focused on whether the punishment comported with evolving standards of decency to determine whether the sentence was cruel or unusual. Chambers I, 589 N.W.2d at 480. To make that determination, we looked to the standards expressed by the Legislature, noting that the Legislature is "constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that recent amendments to the relevant criminal statutes indicated that the Legislature intended to apply a life sentence without the possibility of release to a 17-year-old convicted of first-degree murder of a peace officer. Id. Based on decisions of federal courts on the question, as well as decisions from our court, we concluded that Chambers had failed to meet his heavy burden of proving that his sentence is "well nigh universally rejected," and so his sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Id. We therefore affirmed Chambers' conviction and sentence on March 4, 1999. Id. at 481.
In 2007, Chambers filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirmed the postconviction court's summary denial of Chambers' petition in 2009. Chambers v. State (Chambers II), 769 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Minn.2009). Chambers subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, asserting that he was entitled to relief under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which held that a sentence of life without the possibility of release imposed upon juvenile nonhomicide offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court summarily denied the second petition, concluding that Graham did not apply, that the petition was time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and that none of the exceptions to the time bar applied.
Chambers appealed the denial of his second petition for postconviction relief. While his case was pending before this court, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
Chambers first argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it concluded that Graham was not applicable, that his petition was time barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and that none of the exceptions to the time bar apply. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012). In particular, we review the postconviction court's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
Initially, we must determine whether Chambers' second petition was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). When direct appellate review is not available, a person convicted of a crime who claims that his conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution or other law may file a petition to secure relief from the conviction and sentence, or other appropriate relief. Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2012). Generally, a petition for postconviction relief is untimely if it is not brought within two years of either the entry of judgment of conviction or the appellate court disposition of the petitioner's direct appeal, whichever is later. Id., subd. 4(a)(1)-(2). Chambers' conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal on March 4, 1999. Chambers' second petition was filed on May 13, 2011, well after the time period to file a postconviction petition had lapsed.
Chambers argues that his petition may be heard despite its untimeliness because he asserts a new interpretation of federal constitutional law by the Supreme Court in Graham that is retroactively applicable to his case. Section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(3) provides, in relevant part, that a court may hear a time-barred petition for postconviction relief if the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal law by the United States Supreme Court and the petition establishes that the new interpretation is retroactively applicable to his case.
The United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court considered whether a life without parole sentence given to a juvenile nonhomicide offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 560 U.S. 48, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2023-30, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). As a 16-year-old, Graham was charged with armed burglary and attempted armed robbery after he participated in a failed robbery of a restaurant, in which one of Graham's accomplices hit the manager with a metal bar. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2018. No money was taken and the injured manager only required stitches in his head. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2018. After violating his initial probationary sentence, Graham was sentenced to life imprisonment, the maximum sentence allowed by law and a higher sentence than either the corrections department or the prosecution had requested. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2019-20. Florida abolished its parole system in 2003, leaving Graham with no possibility of release other than executive clemency. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2020.
The Court explained in Graham that proportionality is the touchstone of
The Court noted that Graham was a case of a new kind: "a categorical challenge to a term of years sentence." 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2022. The Court reasoned that Graham was different from challenges to the proportionality of term-of-years sentences because the "sentencing practice itself [was] in question." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2022. Because Graham's challenge "implicate[d] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes," the Court's typical term-of-years proportionality analysis was deemed inapplicable. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2022-23. Instead, for the first time, the Court used the categorical analysis in a non-death penalty case.
Under the categorical approach, the Court first looked to whether a national consensus existed on life imprisonment without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2023-26. After examining actual sentencing practices, the Court concluded that such sentences are rare — "as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2025. The Court then considered "the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, ... the severity of the punishment in question," and whether the challenged sentencing practice served legitimate penological goals. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026. Considering the offenders at issue — juveniles — the Court explained that juveniles have "lessened culpability," a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," and thus are less deserving of the most severe punishments. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court went on to discuss the crimes at issue, nonhomicide crimes, and stated that these crimes "differ from homicide crimes in a moral sense" and are "less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. The Court next discussed the severity of the punishment, life imprisonment without parole, and held that it is the "second most severe penalty permitted by law" and that it "deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration." Id. at ___, 130
Based on the lack of a supporting penological theory, the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and the severity of a life without parole sentence, the Court held that the practice of sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution and thus prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. The Court said: "This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. The Court held that states must allow a juvenile nonhomicide offender a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. Thus, the Court left room for the possibility that a state could incarcerate a juvenile nonhomicide offender for the remainder of the offender's life but prohibited the state from mandating such a sentence at the outset.
Graham also expressed concern for juvenile offenders tried in the adult criminal justice system, stating that "[a]n offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2031. While the Court was cognizant of the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, it also clearly distinguished nonhomicide offenses from homicide offenses. For example, the Court stated that "[t]he instant case concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2023. Further, the Court carefully distinguished the two classes of crimes. The Court stated "defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. The Court thus drew a line between homicide and nonhomicide offenses, in terms of moral depravity and the injury to the victim and the public. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027.
In his second petition for postconviction relief, Chambers acknowledged that, unlike the defendant in Graham, he was a juvenile homicide offender. Nevertheless, he claimed the principles underlying Graham applied with equal force to juvenile homicide offenders. Concluding that the United States Supreme Court had expressly limited its holding in Graham to juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the postconviction court denied Chambers' Graham-based claim without an evidentiary hearing because there were no material facts in dispute and the State was entitled to dismissal as a matter of law.
We conclude that the Court's holding in Graham does not apply to juvenile homicide offenders like Chambers. Graham held that life imprisonment without parole sentences are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders only and explained that homicides are treated differently under the Eighth Amendment. See Graham, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2023 ("The instant
Consequently, Chambers' Graham-based claim fails to satisfy the new interpretation of federal or state law exception in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(3). Accordingly, we hold that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied the claim.
During the pendency of Chambers' appeal, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that the Eighth Amendment "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs to address the potential impact of Miller on Chambers' second petition for postconviction relief. In his supplemental brief, Chambers seeks the benefit of the rule in Miller. Specifically, he contends that Miller applies retroactively to his sentence, and therefore he satisfies the time-bar exception of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3).
In Miller, the Supreme Court considered whether the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. The case involved the consolidated appeals of two 14-year-olds convicted of homicide.
The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by applying two lines of precedent. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463-64, 2469. First, the Court considered previous cases announcing categorical bans on sentencing practices as they apply to juveniles, particularly Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464-66. The Court noted that Graham and Roper "establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. For instance, the Court explained that compared to adults, children lack maturity and a sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to outside influences, and have yet to fully develop their character. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. The Court observed that children have "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. The Court then took the reasoning in Graham one step further and said:
Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2465. Thus, the Court concluded that imposition of life without the possibility of parole sentences on juvenile offenders "cannot proceed as though they were not children." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2466.
Second, the Court applied its jurisprudence requiring individualized decision-making in capital punishment cases, because the Court reasoned that a life without parole sentence for a juvenile is tantamount to a death sentence. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2466-68. The Court expressed concern that "mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2467. Because "[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features," the Court concluded that a sentencing scheme that mandates a life without the possibility of parole sentence for juvenile homicide offenders is unconstitutional. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2468-69.
The Supreme Court was careful to clarify that its holding in Miller was not a categorical prohibition on the punishment, but instead a requirement that the judge or jury consider the individual characteristics of the juvenile offender before imposing a life without the possibility of parole sentence. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. The Court did "not foreclose a sentencer's ability to [impose a life without parole sentence on a juvenile] in homicide cases," but instead required "only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing" a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471
In this case, Chambers was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release under a mandatory sentencing scheme that allowed no discretion or consideration of Chambers' age or the unique characteristics of his background or his offense. Chambers I, 589 N.W.2d at 473. Consequently, we must determine whether Chambers is entitled to the benefit of the rule announced in Miller.
In Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court clarified that when a defendant is entitled to the benefit of a new rule. 489 U.S. 288, 300-10, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). The Court concluded that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." Id. at 305, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But once a conviction or sentence becomes final, the defendant is not entitled to the retroactive benefit of a new rule, subject to two exceptions. Id. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060. First, "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of those procedures that are ... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second exception is "reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure." Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The Court rested its general rule of nonretroactivity to cases pending on collateral review on comity and finality considerations. Danforth v. Minnesota (Danforth II), 552 U.S. 264, 279, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), rev'g Danforth v. State (Danforth I), 718 N.W.2d 451 (Minn.2006). Notably in Teague, the Court stated: "Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." 489 U.S. at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060.
Although the Teague retroactivity doctrine necessarily denies certain defendants the benefit of new rules of criminal procedure, we have consistently recognized the need to safeguard the important principles underlying the doctrine, including finality and providing a bright-line rule for when relief is to be retroactive.
In Houston, we rejected the defendant's claim on collateral review that he was entitled to the retroactive benefit of the new rule announced by the Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which held that "the maximum punishment for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence the judge may impose based solely upon those facts either reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 702 N.W.2d at 271; see also id. at 274. Based on our holding in Houston, defendants on collateral review, who received punishments that exceeded the presumptive guideline sentence based on a sentencing process that was declared unconstitutional in Blakely, were not entitled to resentencing in accordance with the new requirements announced in Blakely.
In Danforth III, we reaffirmed the Teague analysis as a matter of state law and rejected the defendant's claim that he was entitled to the retroactive application of the new rule announced by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which held that defendants have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine witnesses who have made testimonial statements. 761 N.W.2d at 495. In Crawford, the Court emphasized that testing
Finally, in Campos we applied Teague and rejected the defendant's argument that he was entitled to the retroactive benefit of a new rule announced by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires counsel to give correct advice to his or her client when the deportation consequences of a guilty plea are clear. 816 N.W.2d at 487 n. 5, 497-99. Based on our holding in Campos, defendants on collateral review, whose counsel failed to give them correct advice on the deportation consequences of their guilty pleas, were not entitled to new plea hearings conducted in accordance with the requirements announced in Padilla.
In Houston, Danforth III, and Campos, we applied Teague and concluded that the defendant was not entitled to the retroactive benefit of a new rule announced by the Supreme Court. Our analysis in those cases denied certain defendants the benefit of new rules of criminal procedure, but safeguarded the important principles underlying the Teague retroactivity doctrine, particularly finality and providing a bright-line rule for when relief is to be retroactive. For the same reasons, we apply the Teague doctrine to this case.
The first question under the Teague doctrine is whether Miller announced a "new rule." Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 488. A Supreme Court decision "constitutes a new rule within the meaning of Teague if it breaks new ground, imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, or was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 489 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Teague doctrine, a "new rule" generally does not apply to a defendant on collateral review. Id. at 488. This principle serves to "`validat[e] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are later shown to be contrary to later decisions.'" Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)).
The parties do not dispute that Miller announced a new rule and that Chambers' conviction and sentence were final at the time Miller was decided. Indeed, when Chambers' conviction became final in 1999, Roper and Graham had not been decided yet and Miller was certainly not "dictated by precedent." We acknowledge that the Court in Miller stated that it was "breaking no new ground in these cases." ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2472. But as we emphasized in Campos, "[t]he mere fact
Having concluded that Miller announced a new rule, we must next consider whether Chambers is entitled to the retroactive application of Miller. Since Chambers is before us on postconviction review, he must satisfy one of the two narrow exceptions under Teague. Chambers relies on both exceptions. We will discuss each in turn.
The first exception applies to substantive rules that alter the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). In comparison, rules that "regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural," and therefore not substantive. Id. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (emphasis omitted).
Several cases have clarified the difference between substantive and procedural rules. On the one hand, a new rule is "substantive" if the rule "narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms," or "place[s] particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that the definition of a "substantive" rule for purposes of the first Teague exception was not limited to new rules that placed certain conduct completely beyond the State's power to punish. 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Instead, a substantive rule also includes new rules that place a certain class of individuals beyond the State's power to punish by death. Id. In other words, substantive rules "apply retroactively because they `necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal' or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him" because of his status or offense. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (emphasis added) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)).
The Court in Penry explained that in both situations "the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity concerns" underlying the retroactivity doctrine "have little force." 492 U.S.
On the other hand, rules that "regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. "They do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise." Id. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The definition of a procedural rule for purposes of the first Teague exception extends to rules that regulate the manner of determining a defendant's sentence. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997). In Lambrix, the Court considered whether the rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), constituted a substantive or procedural rule under the Teague doctrine. 520 U.S. at 526-27, 117 S.Ct. 1517. Under the Espinosa rule, an actor with capital sentencing authority must not be permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. 505 U.S. at 1082, 112 S.Ct. 2926. The Court in Lambrix held that the Espinosa rule was procedural, not substantive, because it "neither decriminalized a class of conduct nor prohibited the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of persons." 520 U.S. at 539, 117 S.Ct. 1517 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (holding that the rule announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), which requires that a jury with capital sentencing authority must be made aware of the gravity of its task, was procedural).
In summary, a new rule regarding sentencing is substantive if it eliminates the power of the State to impose the punishment in question regardless of the procedures followed. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934. On the other hand, the new rule is procedural if it regulates the manner in which the State exercises its continuing power to impose the punishment in question. Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539, 117 S.Ct. 1517. Keeping the difference between substantive and procedural rules in mind, we consider Chambers' arguments regarding the Teague exceptions.
Chambers' primary argument is that the Miller rule satisfies the first Teague exception:
We conclude that the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama is procedural, not substantive. We reach that conclusion for several reasons. First, the rule announced in Miller does not eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of release upon a juvenile offender who has committed a homicide offense.
Second, relevant federal decisions have concluded Miller is procedural, and therefore not retroactive. See, e.g., Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). In Craig, the Fifth Circuit explained:
Craig, 2013 WL 69128 *2 (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004); Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539, 117 S.Ct. 1517; Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822; and Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257). The Fifth Circuit held that "Miller does not satisfy the [first Teague exception] because it does not categorically bar all sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller bars only those sentences made mandatory by a sentencing scheme." Id. Like the Fifth Circuit, we conclude that the Miller rule is similar to the rules at issue in Lambrix and Sawyer because the Miller rule does not deprive the State of the power to punish a juvenile homicide offender with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, but instead only prohibits a specific sentencing method, procedure, or scheme — namely, mandatory sentencing statutes.
Third, despite Chambers' assertion to the contrary, the Miller rule does not announce a new "element." Unlike the Arizona statute at issue in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the Miller rule does not mandate that a certain aggravating factor be proven before the State imposes the sentence in question. In Ring, the statute at issue provided that a "death sentence may not legally be imposed ... unless at least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt." 536 U.S. at 597, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ring Court held that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the `functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citations omitted).
In Schriro, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the rule announced in Ring was substantive under the first Teague exception because it "modified the elements of the offense for which he was convicted." 542 U.S. at 354, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Court explained that "because Arizona has made a certain fact essential to the death penalty, that fact must be found by a jury, [but that] is not the same as this Court's making a certain fact essential to the death penalty. The former was a procedural holding; the latter would be substantive." Id. By requiring a sentencer to consider the potentially mitigating circumstances of an offender's youth and attendant characteristics, the Miller rule does not create a requirement that is the "functional equivalent of an element." See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true when the Miller rule does not require the sentencer to make any specific finding of fact and when the Supreme Court has recognized the distinction "between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Miller does not announce a new element because it does not require the State to prove any specific fact before the sentencer imposes the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on a juvenile homicide offender.
In summary, we conclude that the rule announced in Miller is procedural, not substantive, for three reasons. First, the Miller rule does not eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of release upon a juvenile offender who has committed a homicide offense. Second, our analysis is consistent with relevant
Having concluded that the Miller rule is procedural, we next consider Chambers' alternative argument that, even if we conclude that the Miller rule is procedural, he is still entitled to retroactive application of the rule because it is a watershed rule and therefore satisfies the second Teague exception. In order to qualify as a watershed rule, a "new rule must both be `necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction' and `alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.'" Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 498 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007)). But as we recognized in Campos, "[t]he [Supreme] Court has repeatedly emphasized that the watershed `exception is extremely narrow,' and since its decision in Teague has `rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.'" Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 497 (quoting Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417-18, 127 S.Ct. 1173). In fact, the Court has indicated that "it is unlikely that any" watershed rules have "`yet to emerge.'" Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001)). "To come within the watershed exception, the rule must institute procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, ... and it is not enough that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial, or even that it promotes [t]he objectives of fairness and accuracy." Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 498 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only case that has ever satisfied this high threshold is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), in which the Court "`held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent defendant charged with a felony.'" Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 498 (quoting Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419, 127 S.Ct. 1173).
We conclude that Miller is not a watershed rule for two reasons. First, Miller deals exclusively with sentencing and does not "impact the accuracy of an underlying determination of guilt or innocence." Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273. Moreover, Miller's holding, "unlike the expansive rule in Gideon establishing a right to counsel in all felony cases, affects only a small subset of defendants, indicating that the rule does not have a fundamental and profound impact on criminal proceedings generally." Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 499. Second, the Miller Court's review of its precedents demonstrates that its holding was not a "watershed" development. The Court's cases have long established that "sentencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual." Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)) (holding that the imposition of mandatory death sentence without consideration of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense was inconsistent with the fundamental respect for humanity that underlies the Eighth Amendment); Penry, 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934 ("In order to ensure `reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,' ... the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the crime." (citation omitted);
Consequently, the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), is a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure that is neither substantive nor a watershed rule that alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Therefore, Chambers is not entitled to the retroactive benefit of the Miller rule in a postconviction proceeding.
Accordingly, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Chambers' postconviction petition without a hearing because the petition was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), and none of the exceptions in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b), apply.
Affirmed.
Concurring, ANDERSON, G. BARRY and WRIGHT, JJ. Dissenting, ANDERSON, PAUL H. and PAGE, JJ. Dissenting, PAGE and ANDERSON, PAUL H., JJ.
ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice (concurring).
I join the majority opinion because I agree with the majority's analysis that under existing precedent the rule in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. I write separately to observe that any modification of the existing precedent should be left to the United States Supreme Court, whether here or in some other case, because the Court has determined the constitutional limits that underlie Miller, and it is United States Supreme Court jurisprudence at issue in the matter before us. The parties here did not brief other potential avenues for relief under Minnesota law, so contrary to the dissent, I would not reach those questions. I believe such issues are better left for another day, with a better record, and perhaps a clearer explanation of retroactivity doctrine by the United States Supreme Court.
WRIGHT, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice G. Barry Anderson.
ANDERSON, Justice PAUL H. (dissenting).
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.
I respectfully dissent. I am loathe to join an opinion of our court that permits an unconstitutional sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release to
Indisputably, Chambers's prison sentence of life without the possibility of release was imposed under a Minnesota statute that the United States Supreme Court has rendered unconstitutional when that statute's mandatory without-possibility-of-release provision is applied to a juvenile offender. See Minn.Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1) (2012). In its recent decision, Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that any sentence imposed on a juvenile under a statute such as section 609.106, subdivision 2(1), violates the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2475. I conclude that the majority's holding, which allows Chambers's sentence to remain in place, is not only wrong, but the opinion is arrantly objectionable because it leaves Chambers's sentence forever unexamined under the rule articulated in Miller.
The majority's opinion is remarkable and erroneous for several reasons. First, as previously noted, the Supreme Court has held that Chambers's sentence is tantamount to a death sentence for an offender who, like Chambers, is sentenced for a crime committed when he was a juvenile. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2466-67. This holding standing alone is more than sufficient reason to distinguish today's case from those the majority relies on to support its decision. Therefore, I would conclude that the Supreme Court's holding provides a sufficient basis upon which to grant a remand to the postconviction court to reassess Chambers's sentence in the context of the constitutional mandate articulated in Miller. Second, despite what the majority asserts, there are at least three viable, well-grounded, and principled legal routes available to us so that we can avoid the result reached by the majority today. The need to refute the majority's analysis is heightened by my knowledge that there are multiple routes available to order a remand. Finally, the need to dissent is magnified by the fact that the majority either chooses to ignore or fears to fully recognize the viability of any of the alternative routes.
The majority has decided — for reasons that I find unpersuasive — to dismiss the opportunity to reach a different result by failing to take any of these viable alternate analytical routes. More specifically, the majority, demonstrating what I consider to be an overabundance of caution, rejects the first route of analysis — a Teague substantive-rule retroactive application analysis. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion). The majority does so on the grounds that the substantive-rule route is too narrow and/or too risky to take given how difficult it is to interpret and construe United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, and to predict what the Court will do in a future case. The majority rejects the second route outright — a route designed and delivered to us by the Supreme Court itself in Danforth v. Minnesota (Danforth II), 552 U.S. 264, 128 S.Ct. 1029,
I cannot understand, much less appreciate, why the majority is so drawn to the continued imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment. The majority consciously avoids the clear and principled lines of legal analysis available to it to remand this case to the postconviction court. The postconviction court should be allowed to fix the constitutionally defective portion of Chamber's sentence — its mandatory nature — and to resentence Chambers in accordance with his constitutional rights as articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller.
Instead of allowing Chambers's sentence to be made compliant with Miller, the majority chooses an analytical route that leads to the harsh result announced today. That result mandates the continued imposition of Chambers's constitutionally impermissible sentence. The majority's course of action is especially puzzling given that a remand to the postconviction court does not in and of itself change the life-in-prison-without-release aspect of Chambers's sentence. A remand merely allows a correction of the unconstitutional mandatory nature of Chambers's sentence. In essence, a remand will allow the postconviction court to reconsider Chambers's sentence under criteria that fit within the ambit of the United States Constitution.
For all of these reasons I must reject the majority's analysis and dissent from its holding. I will now proceed to explain in more detail the reasons and legal analysis that mandate my rejection of the majority's opinion.
Rightly or wrongly, as the majority articulates, our court has adopted the principles that the Supreme Court outlined in Teague v. Lane to determine whether a rule of federal constitutional law applies in a collateral appeal. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion); see also Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 489-90 (Minn.2012) (applying Teague).
The Supreme Court stated that Miller arose from "[t]wo strands of precedent reflecting [the] concern with proportionate punishment." Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. The first are cases that "adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2022-23). The Court stated that "[s]everal of the cases in this [first] group have specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (emphasis added). The second strand that Miller drew on was case law where the Court has "require[ed] that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463-64 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)(plurality opinion)). In discussing these two lines of cases, the Court restated its observations on juveniles and the death penalty in Graham v. Florida, where the Court "likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself." Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. "Of special pertinence," the Court stated, "we have insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the `mitigating qualities of youth.'" Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)).
The foregoing framework from Miller makes a few points that should be central to our analysis. First, juveniles are different — their lessened culpability due to their youth means that they must be treated differently than adult offenders. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464.
In Teague, a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated the proposition that
Having concluded that Miller adopted a new rule, the next question to answer is whether the rule in Miller applies retroactively. The answer to this question turns on whether either of the exceptions to the Teague rule applies to Chambers's sentence. Because I conclude that the rule in Miller is substantive rather than procedural in nature, I also conclude that the best route for us to follow is to apply the rule from Miller retroactively in this and other similar cases. Moreover, our mandate to do so arises from what I believe is a simple, straight-forward application of the substantive-rule exception in Teague and its progeny.
In general, a rule "is substantive rather than procedural if [the rule] alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)). The Supreme Court has held that new rules "prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense" are substantive. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The Court has stated that substantive rules "apply retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant [1] stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or [2] faces a punishment that the law cannot impose" upon him because of the offense the defendant stands convicted of or the class to which the person being punished belongs. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (internal quotation marks omitted). A new rule that "modifies the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural." Id. at 354, 124 S.Ct. 2519.
In Schriro, the Supreme Court considered whether the new rule it announced in Ring v. Arizona applied retroactively. Id. at 349, 124 S.Ct. 2519; see also Ring v.
The factors that the Supreme Court outlined in Schriro for comparing substantive and procedural rules lead me to conclude that the rule in Miller is distinguishable from the rule in Ring and that the Miller rule is substantive in nature. First, Miller not only altered the "range of conduct" that is punishable by life imprisonment, Miller prohibited life imprisonment without release for juveniles absent the additional consideration of a juvenile defendant's "`lessened culpability'" and "greater `capacity for change.'" Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026-27, 2029-30). The Court concluded that any punishment must be "graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense." Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Miller changed the range of permissible punishment — no mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of release — based on the offense at issue and the class of offender at issue. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352-53, 124 S.Ct. 2519. In sum, the change in Miller is substantive, at least in part, because Chambers is serving a sentence that the State may not be able to impose on him.
Second, unlike the procedural change at issue in Schriro, Miller was decided under the Eighth Amendment. This distinction is significant. By no means does every challenge under the Eighth Amendment involve a substantive rather than procedural rule. For example, in Graham v. Collins, the Supreme Court held that the mechanism by which a jury considers mitigating evidence is procedural, rather than substantive. 506 U.S. 461, 477, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). But the categorical barrier that is present when considering new rules applying the Sixth Amendment and which precludes a conclusion that such rules are substantive is absent here. This distinction sets Chambers's case apart from Schriro, as well as from our recent decision in Campos. See Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 488-99 (considering and rejecting the retroactive application of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), which involved Sixth Amendment rights).
Finally, Miller not only altered the "range of permissible methods" by which a juvenile can be punished, it created what functions as a new element that must be considered before a juvenile may be sentenced
The following observation should help to demonstrate why the rule in Miller establishes what functions as an additional element that must be satisfied before a court can sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole. If Miller represents a reallocation of procedural decision-making authority, then the body making the requisite "decision" that Miller requires should be readily identifiable. For instance, the rule in Ring reallocated decision-making from the judge to the jury. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The rule in Padilla reallocated from defense counsel to the defendant any decision-making based on information about the immigration implications of a guilty plea. See Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 485-87. And in Graham v. Collins, the Court held that an extension of the rule in Penry v. Lynaugh was procedural in nature because it would alter the manner in which a jury is instructed to consider mitigating circumstances. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 477-78, 113 S.Ct. 892. No such reallocation of decision-making can be identified in Miller. The sentencing statutes invalidated under Miller explicitly barred the consideration of mitigating circumstances particular to juvenile offenders from being taken into account whatsoever, consideration of which is now mandated under Miller. This additional element renders the rule from Miller substantive in nature, rather than merely a procedural rule that reallocates decision-making authority.
The majority states that "Miller simply imposes a new procedure in which the sentencing judge must consider the youthfulness of the offender." Supra at 328 n. 10. I acknowledge that nearly all aspects of the law contain an element of procedure; but, by saying that "Miller simply imposes a new procedure," the majority cannot and should not ignore that no judicial decision maker in Chambers's case has yet addressed what the Supreme Court says is now required before life in prison without the possibility of release may be imposed on a juvenile offender like Chambers. Under Miller, to quote the majority, the decision whether to impose life in prison without release "must consider the youthfulness of the offender." Supra at 328 n. 10. Unless consideration of an offender's youthfulness is merely pro forma — in which case Miller's holding provides illusory relief — then the majority's contention that the State retains "the ultimate power ... to impose the punishment in question" cannot be justified on the record before us. Under Miller, before the State may impose a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release on a juvenile offender, the sentencing body must make individualized findings because "youth matters for purposes of meting out the law's most serious punishments" — a sentence that is akin to the death penalty. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. No such findings exist in Chambers's case and therefore any assertion that the State could impose Chambers's sentence upon him if he were sentenced today is, at best, speculation. More is required to be put on the record before the State may impose such a sentence on any juvenile offender. Therefore,
An additional factor that strongly counsels in favor of concluding that the rule in Miller is substantive in nature and, thus is retroactive, is that the rules in the line of cases leading up to Miller have almost universally been held to be substantive rules. The Supreme Court stated that the rule in Miller arose from "two strands of precedent reflecting our concerns with proportionate punishment." Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. One strand of cases focuses on limiting punishment for classes of defendants with lessened culpability due to their status. Id. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court banned capital punishment for "mentally retarded" defendants. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). That opinion led to Roper, where the Court banned capital punishment for children. 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1. Then in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), the Supreme Court "likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself." Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (discussing the reasoning in Graham v. Florida). The Court restricted the types of offenses for which juveniles can be sentenced to life in prison without release. Graham v, Florida, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2034 (limiting such a sentence to homicide offenses).
The Court's new rule in Miller arises from the Court's existing precedent in Atkins, Roper, and Graham v. Florida. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. The Federal Courts of Appeals that have looked at the retroactivity of the rules articulated in Atkins, Roper, and Graham v. Florida have unanimously held that those rules are substantive in nature and thus apply to collateral appeals.
The majority is only able to discern a procedural reallocation of decision-making when it analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in Miller. Yet, the majority cannot, nor can anyone, identify which sentencing body was previously making the individualized determination now required before a juvenile, like Chambers, may be given the equivalent of the death penalty — life in prison without the possibility of release. But new rules where no prior decision was rendered under the rule are exactly the types of rules that the Supreme Court has stated are retroactive, because "they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant ... faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him" any longer. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Therefore, because Miller "prohibit[ed] a certain category of punishment," (mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of release) "for a class of defendants because of their status," (juveniles), see Penry, 492 U.S. at 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, I conclude that the rule in Miller is substantive in nature and would hold that, under the substantive-rule exception in Teague, it applies retroactively.
While I conclude that the best analytical route to take when deciding this case is to hold that, under the principles of Teague, the rule from Miller should apply retroactively,
The Supreme Court has provided us with a second route to take which will allow us to remand to the postconviction court. More specifically, the Court has explicitly stated that, as the state court that is charged with interpreting and applying Minnesota's Constitution and criminal laws, we are not bound by Teague when making determinations about whether rules apply retroactively under state law. Danforth II, 552 U.S. at 266, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (stating that Teague does not "constrain[] the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required" in the federal habeas context by Teague).
In Danforth I, our court held that we were bound by the principles set forth in Teague when we considered whether new rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively to convictions on collateral review. 718 N.W.2d at 456-57. The Supreme Court reversed our court in Danforth II, holding that the Teague principles were specific to the context of federal habeas petitions and, therefore, were not binding on state courts applying state law. 552 U.S. at 277-81, 128 S.Ct. 1029. On remand, our court nonetheless elected to tether itself to Teague. Danforth III, 761 N.W.2d at 498-500.
As I acknowledged in Danforth III, there are aspects of Teague that are "sound in principle." Id. at 500 (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically,
I continue to have no doubt that, by adopting Teague, our court erected an unnecessary — and unnecessarily harsh — self-imposed barrier that is both "too narrow and strict in its application." Id. at 502. I now know that my concerns were justified. Today is the day that this narrow, strict, and unnecessary rule leads the majority to refuse to enforce a "constitutional safeguard[] that warrant[s] collateral review." Id. at 500. Despite the majority's statement that the dissent is "reframing" the issue before us — followed immediately by the majority's own framing of the issue — there is indisputably one issue before us and it cannot be ignored. Today the majority retreats behind its self-imposed barrier and leaves in place a sentence that the State of Minnesota could not impose on Chambers if the State were to attempt to do so today.
The stark reality of this change in circumstance requires that a court reassess Chambers's sentence. The Supreme Court has compared Chambers's mandatory sentence, which the majority elects to leave untouched, to the death penalty itself, and has unequivocally held that such a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. All Minnesota citizens are entitled to have their rights under both the federal and state constitutions vindicated. Minnesotans are entitled to protection from the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and from "cruel or unusual punishments" under article 1, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution. The majority's refusal to issue a remand to the postconviction court so that Chambers can be resentenced in compliance with either the United States or Minnesota Constitutions is simply beyond me. I would accept the invitation of the Supreme Court to untether our jurisprudence from the federal habeas standard in Teague when applying our state law in a case like the one before us today. For the reasons outlined in this section, I would interpret our holding in Danforth III such that the new rule from Miller applies retroactively.
There is yet a third route that is available in this case — fundamental fairness in
By any stretch of the imagination, the result reached by the majority in this case is inconsistent with fundamental fairness. Chambers was given a sentence that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We have long recognized that we have the "supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice." State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.1994). We have, in rare and extraordinary cases, exercised that power because "[i]t is our duty to supervise the criminal justice system." State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn.1999). We have exercised our supervisory power to reverse convictions prophylactically and in the interests of justice based on prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Minn.1995). We have allowed a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea and have a trial. See Shorter v. State, 511 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn.1994). We have required the provision of counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases, see State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967), and civil cases, see Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn.1979); and we have required that certain kinds of proceedings take place, State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 n. 17 (Minn.1980).
Without question, the precise contours of our supervisory power are not easily delineated. State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 867 (Minn.2012) (Stras, J., dissenting). But the thread that binds our court's interests — of-justice jurisprudence is, in my view, quite simple: our court must, at times, act as a backstop — the court of last resort — to protect "the human, political, and property rights guaranteed by the constitution." In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minn., 216 Minn. 195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943). Those words, written by our court seven decades ago, are still applicable today and are applicable to Chambers. This case squarely implicates our supervisory powers because if we fail to act, then Chambers will spend the remainder of his life serving a sentence that the Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional.
In Danforth III, we left open a narrow window — too narrow in my view, but a window nonetheless — to account for a case like the one we confront today. And consistent with the rule we announced in Danforth III, I conclude, based on a careful review of the facts and circumstances here, that denying Chambers the benefit of the new rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Miller is inconsistent with fundamental fairness.
I acknowledge that Chambers's underlying conviction has been previously reviewed and upheld by our court and that the murder of Deputy Sheriff John Liebenstein was a horrible and despicable act. But it is ill-advised for two reasons, one major and one minor, to use Chambers's statement that "if the cop wanted to be a hero he would die a hero," and similar
The other reason, the major reason, why the use of Chambers's statement and other facts specific to his case is ill-advised, is that today's decision not only affects Chambers, but at least six other juvenile offenders in Minnesota who are serving mandatory sentences of life in prison without release. There are six juvenile offenders serving sentences that could not be imposed following Miller absent additional, individualized development of the record in their respective cases. Further, there are perhaps hundreds of other similarly situated defendants in other states who will also grapple with the retroactivity of Miller. These defendants and the courts in their respective states may look to our court's decision in this case for direction because we are one of the first state supreme courts to have addressed this specific question.
In sum, I cannot abide by the result reached by the majority today. For all the reasons I have articulated in this dissent, I conclude that the majority's holding: (1) is inconsistent with the substantive-rule exception under Teague; (2) ignores the Supreme Court's invitation to us as a state court to apply our state law separately from the federal habeas standard articulated by the Court in Teague; and (3) is incompatible with our concept of what constitutes fundamental fairness in Minnesota. Therefore, I would reverse the postconviction court and remand to that court for the imposition of a sentence that is neither cruel nor unusual under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Paul Anderson. I write separately, however, because I would be remiss if I did not point out that, by its decision today, the court fails in carrying out one of our most basic responsibilities. At the core, our court is responsible for ensuring that justice is done. In the case of Timothy Chambers, justice has not been done.
For the reasons stated in Justice Paul Anderson's dissent, I disagree with the court's conclusion that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) — prohibiting mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juvenile offenders — should not apply retroactively because of the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and adopted by our court in Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn.2009).
Under Teague, a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure is retroactive if it "prohibited imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 496-97 (alteration omitted) (emphasis added). That is precisely what happened here. Miller prohibited
Moreover, Teague is the standard we apply for determining the "retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure set by the United States Supreme Court." Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 494 (emphasis added). But, as Justice Paul Anderson's dissent points out, Miller was decided under the Eighth Amendment and deals with the kinds of punishments that legislatures can constitutionally impose. Under the separation of powers, while this court has primary authority for matters of procedure, the Legislature has primary authority for matters of substance. See State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn.2001). Among the Legislature's substantive authority is the "power to define the conduct which constitutes a criminal offense and to fix the punishment for such conduct." See State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Minn.1982); see also State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 215, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615-16 (1976). In other words, we have held that the kind of sentence that a defendant can serve is a quintessential matter of substance. And because it is a matter of substance, Teague, by its own terms, is not a bar to applying Miller.
Further, as the court notes, Danforth's adoption of the Teague standard for retroactivity is based almost exclusively on principles of "finality." But the finality discussed in Danforth is specifically "the finality of convictions." 761 N.W.2d at 498 (emphasis added). In other words, we were concerned with the finality of determinations of guilt or innocence, not with the finality of sentences. See id. at 498-99 (noting the concern that retroactive rules will require burdensome retrial of defendants through the testimony of witnesses whose memories have dimmed, and making numerous references to the trial of the defendant). In this case, finality concerns
Finally, it is not clear to me that the rule set out in Teague applies to Chambers' sentence. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[t]he court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Given the Court's decision in Miller, there can be no question that Chambers' sentence is not authorized by law. Thus, under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, the court has authority to correct Chambers' sentence. It simply chooses not to exercise that authority.
I also agree with Justice Paul Anderson that we should revisit our decision in Danforth and accept the United States Supreme Court's invitation to adopt a different standard governing the retroactive application of new constitutional rules. But even if we decline to revisit Danforth, ignore Teague's exception for prohibited imposition of punishment for a certain class of defendants because of their status, and apply the Teague rule to the Supreme Court's rulings on substantive constitutional law, I would nonetheless depart from the Teague rule in cases such as this one. Teague should not apply in situations, like here, in which the defendant on direct appeal challenges his sentence as unconstitutional, we erroneously reject that challenge, and the United States Supreme Court subsequently corrects our error.
Following his conviction, Chambers filed a direct appeal in our court. Among the arguments he raised was the claim that "the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole as applied to [a] 17-year-old... violates the constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment."
As it turns out, we got it wrong. The one who did not get it wrong was Chambers. In Miller, the Supreme Court held "that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against `cruel and unusual punishments.'" 132 S.Ct. at 2460. The Court noted that, "[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence," the mandatory imposition of life without the possibility of release "poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." Id. at 2469.
Had we accepted Chambers' argument in 1999 — as we should have — Chambers would, at a minimum, have been entitled to a hearing to determine whether life imprisonment without the possibility of release (as opposed to life with the possibility of release) was the appropriate punishment for him considering all the circumstances, including his age.
Justice and fairness require that a defendant, who timely and properly objects to his sentence based on a correct interpretation of the constitution, be granted the protections of the constitution notwithstanding the misfortune of having a court erroneously reject his interpretation on direct appeal. No defendant should have to pay for our mistakes. We noted in Danforth our concern that, if we applied a broader retroactivity test than Teague, "limited judicial resources may be expended litigating the convictions of defendants who never challenged" the alleged unconstitutional practice. See 761 N.W.2d at 499. That concern is simply not present here because Chambers did directly challenge the mandatory imposition of life without the possibility of release against a juvenile offender.
In sum, justice requires, at a minimum, that Chambers have a resentencing hearing. We have the power to grant that
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Page.
The Anderson dissent argues that retroactive application of the Miller rule will not adversely affect the administration of justice because "a remand will allow the postconviction court to reconsider Chambers's sentence." Infra at D-4. For the same reasons expressed above, this argument lacks merit. Further, an argument that the degree of retroactivity afforded a new rule should depend on "the particular rule under consideration" is no more persuasive today than it was in Danforth III, 761 N.W.2d at 502 (Anderson, Paul, J. dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2465-66.
